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FEAR AND LOATHING IN MASSACHUSETTS:
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND SOME LESSONS
FROM THE HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
JOANNA L. GROSSMAN*
In May 2004, Massachusetts became the first and only state in the union to
permit same-sex couples to marry.1 A month earlier, Massachusetts Governor Mitt
Romney had announced his intent to enforce a little-known 1913 state law limiting
the ability of out-of-state couples to marry in Massachusetts unless their home state
would also permit them to marry. 2 "Massachusetts should not become the Las
Vegas of same-sex marriage,",3 he declared in a statement to the press.
Las Vegas is known for its impulsive and often short-lived marriages, like the
55-hour marriage between Britney Spears and a childhood friend that was annulled
Professor, Hofstra Law School. B.A., Amherst College; J.D., Stanford Law School.
This essay was prepared for "Same Sex Marriage in Massachusetts: The Meaning and
Implications of Goodridge v. Department of Public Health," Southern New England School
of Law, June 11, 2004. My considered thanks to John DeWitt Gregory and J. Herbie
DiFonzo for their comments, and to Elizabeth Cohen and Susann Duffy for their assistance
with footnotes.
1 In November, 2003, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts struck down the
state's ban on same-sex marriage as a violation of the state constitutional guarantee of equal
protection. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). It gave
the legislature 180 days to conform its laws to the ruling, see id. at 970, and marriage
licenses were first issued to same-sex couples on May 17, 2004. See Pam Belluck, Hundreds
of Same-Sex Couples Wed in Massachusetts, N. Y. TIMEs, May 18, 2004, at Al ("On the first
day here, the issuing of licenses and the marriage ceremonies proceeded without many snags
or confrontations."). Other states, including Vermont, California, New Jersey, and Hawaii,
provide some level of formal recognition to same-sex couples who choose it but none
permits them to "marry." See Joanna L. Grossman, The New Jersey Domestic Partnership
Law: Its Formal Recognition of Same-Sex Couples, and How it Differs From Other States'
Approaches, FindLaw's Writ, http://writ.news/findlaw.com/grossman/2004/
0113.html (Jan. 13, 2004) (comparing and contrasting state approaches to the legal
recognition of same-sex couples).
2 See Pam Belluck, Romney Won't Let Gay Outsiders Wed in Massachusetts, N. Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 25, 2004, at Al; see also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 207, § 11 (2004) (prohibiting
non-residents from marrying in Massachusetts "if such marriage would be void if
contracted" in their home state).
3 See Belluck, supra note 2, at Al.
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three days after it was celebrated.4 But couples don't abscond to Las Vegas to
marry because they can't marry in their home states. They marry there because the
culture caters to impulse, and a spontaneous Las Vegas wedding can be enticing (to
some, anyway). As Britney Spears lamented, reflecting on her ill-considered
marriage: "I do believe in the sanctity of marriage, I totally do. But I was in Vegas,
and it took over me."5 Massachusetts, on the other hand, is not reputed to have
such an effect on people - although opposite-sex couples might well choose to
marry there because Cape Cod presents a romantic wedding spot. Same-sex
couples want to marry there because no other state in the union will permit them to
do so.
So what does it mean to be the "Las Vegas of same-sex marriage?" Governor
Romney's warning makes sense only as a reference to Las Vegas' reputation for
6the "quickie" divorce, rather than the impulsive marriage. Historically, a
"quickie" divorce was something most states did not make available, but Nevada
did.7 Spouses thus went to Las Vegas or Reno to procure something they could not
obtain in their home states, either at all, or at least not as quickly or painlessly as
they desired. It is this history Romney apparently invokes as a cautionary tale for
Massachusetts.
In modem society, providing out-of-staters with a "quickie" divorce does not
necessarily invite moral opprobrium upon the forum state. Yet Romney's reference
was meant to foretell doom for Massachusetts as it, alone, legalizes same-sex
marriage.s Historical context reveals the more pejorative meaning of the phrase
"quickie divorce," and provides an interesting basis for comparing the 150-year-old
battle over accessible divorce with the comparatively short contemporary one over
4 See I Blame It on Vegas, BIRMINGHAM EVENING MAIL, Jan. 15, 2004, at 6. Spears's
timing was ironic, given the ongoing national debate about same-sex marriage and President
Bush's declaration, designed to galvanize opponents, that marriage should be a "sacred
institution." See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement of the President,
President Defends Sanctity of Marriage (Nov. 18, 2003), (at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031118-4.html). Columnist Ellen
Goodman noted the irony of Spears's marriage given the oft-made argument that same-sex
marriage should be banned because it "disparages heterosexual marriage." "Who," she
queried, "needs gay couples when you have Britney and Jason?" See Ellen Goodman,
Marriages: Gay and Throwaway, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 11, 2004, at L11.
5 See I Blame it on Vegas, supra note 4 (quoting Britney Spears).
6 See generally NELSON MANFRED BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN
THE UNITED STATES 152-59 (1977).
7 See generally id (describing the history of divorce in the United States, with particular
emphasis on the issue of migratory divorce); see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, PRIVATE
LIVES: FAMILIES, INDIVIDUALS, AND THE LAW 33-43 (2004) [hereinafter PRIVATE LIVES];
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 204 (2d ed. 1985); WILLIAM
O'NEILL, DIVORCE IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 246-47 (1967).
8 Lower courts in Washington and New York have recently invalidated bans on same-sex
marriage under state constitutional principles. See Anderson v. Kings County, No. 04-2-
04964-4-SEA, 2004 WL 1738447 (Wash. Super., Aug. 4, 2004); Hemandez v. Robles, No.
103434/2004 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 4, 2005).
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same-sex marriage. This essay first retraces the history of divorce in the United
States, with a particular focus on the persistent non-uniformity of divorce laws and
the resulting concerns about migratory divorce. It then considers our historical
experience with non-uniformity in the marriage context, focusing on the legal and
cultural responses to evasive marriages. Finally, it draws on the parallel histories
of migratory divorce and evasive marriage to reconsider the contemporary battle
over same-sex marriage, which reinvokes historical tensions between the desire for
uniformity of state laws and the right of states to regulate domestic relations at the
local level. The essay concludes with a different cautionary tale than Romney's:
States can peaceably co-exist with non-uniform marriage laws, and historical
attempts to make them quasi-uniform through the enforcement of laws against
migratory divorce or evasive marriages have been largely ineffective.
I. NON-UNIFORMITY AND MIGRATORY DIVORCE
States today are in virtual agreement that divorce is, at the end of the day, an
individual entitlement that need be preceded only by separation or a plea of
incompatibility. 9 States differ in the procedural hurdles they impose, but regardless
of what the statutes provide, divorce in practice, in many states, has truly become
"divorce on demand," with either spouse having an essentially unilateral right of
dissolution.'0 This was, of course, not always the case in the American states.
In colonial America, most states did not have provisions for judicial divorce, but
instead followed England's "divorceless" tradition." After the Revolutionary war,
states began to permit courts to grant divorces, but most retained tight control over
marriages and differed, sometimes dramatically, in their willingness to dissolve
them. The South, in general, was hostile to divorce, and South Carolina banned it
9 See American Bar Association, Grounds for Divorce and Residency Requirements,
available at http://www.abanet.org/family/familylaw/Chart4_GroundsDivorce.pdf
(comparing grounds for divorce in all 50 states).
10 See, e.g., J. Herbie DiFonzo, No-Fault Marital Dissolution: The Bitter Triumph of
Naked Divorce, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 519, 519 (1994) ("The elimination of grounds
transformed mutual consent divorce, the operating milieu for most of the twentieth century,
into divorce on demand.") Only a few states, most notably New York, have retained a real
requirement of mutual consent as the only alternative to a fault-based divorce. See N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 170(5), (6) (McKinney 2001) (requiring that couples be separated for one
year pursuant to either a legal decree of separation or a written separation agreement,
resolving all the issues between the parties, before filing for divorce on the basis of
"separation"); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 170(1)-(4) (McKinney 2001) (listing fault grounds for
divorce). But even New York seems poised to update its law to provide for divorce without
proof of fault or mutual consent. See Joanna L. Grossman, Will New York Finally Adopt
True No-Fault Divorce? Recent Proposals to Amend the State's Archaic Divorce Law,
FindLaw's Writ, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20041020.html (Oct. 20, 2004).
" See FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 7, at 204 (noting that
England did not permit judicial divorce until 1857). Legislative divorce was sometimes
available, until states abolished the practice in the latter half of the nineteenth century. See
id. at 498.
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altogether. 12 In contrast, northern states other than New York and western states in
general tended to be more forgiving, though still strict by modem standards.13 All
states required that an "innocent" spouse file for divorce on one of the legislatively
enumerated grounds. The plaintiff spouse had to "prove" the grounds, and a
divorce could be granted only with corroborated evidence of fault. While
consensual divorces were forbidden by statute, most early statutes made divorce
accessible, though "not routine or automatic. 14
What sometimes gets lost in the retelling of the history of divorce is how the
states collectively progressed from the post-Revolutionary period to the modem
day, where divorce is both routine and automatic. The earliest divorce laws varied
primarily in the grounds upon which a divorce could be granted. Strict states, like
New York, recognized only adultery as a justification for divorce, 15 while
California recognized not only adultery, but also abandonment, neglect,
intemperance, felony conviction, and extreme cruelty. 16 Most other states fell
somewhere in the middle, recognizing adultery plus a few additional grounds. 17 A
few states had very broad, general grounds, like Rhode Island, which permitted
divorce for "gross misbehaviour and wickedness in either of the parties, repugnant
to and in violation of the marriage covenant."'
18
The divorce laws in specific states were in flux through much of the nineteenth
century and into the twentieth. Divorce law's progression from generally strict to
generally lenient occurred in fits and starts, as the balance between the anti-divorce
moralists and the social demand for divorce tipped in one direction or the other in a
given state or region. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, concerns about
the rising divorce rate were already palpable. Anti-divorce moralists warned of the
doom divorce would bring; the "whole community," one ardent opponent insisted,
"would be thrown... into a general prostitution."' 9 Those in favor of divorce were
just as vocal and rhetorically forceful, as feminists like Elizabeth Cady Stanton
insisted that "[i]t is vain to look for the elevation of woman so long as she is
degraded in marriage.",20 Pragmatists also favored looser divorce laws because they
were "favourable to the virtue and the happiness of mankind.",21 Joel Prentiss
12 See FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 7, at 204-05.
'3 See BLAKE, supra note 6, at 62 ("states of the Old Northwest tended to pass rather
liberal divorce laws"); FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 7, at 205.
14 See FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 7, at 207.
'5 See N.Y. REv. STAT. ch. 8, tit. 1, § 42 (1852).
16 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 92 (Hart 1889).
17 See BLAKE, supra note 6, at 48-63 (discussing grounds for divorce in a variety of states
in the nineteenth century).
18 See id. at 50.
19 3 TIMOTHY DWIGHT, THEOLOGY EXPLAINED AND DEFENDED IN A SERIES OF SERMONS
434 (5th ed. 1828), quoted in BLAKE, supra note 6, at 59.
20 CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 175 (1980).
21 1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 192-93
(1795).
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Bishop, author of the first comprehensive treatise on divorce law in the United
States, published in 1851,22 thought divorce law should be "adapted to the general
needs of society."23 Pointing to Connecticut, which had an omnibus ground for
divorce, he noted, "there is in our Union no State wherein domestic felicity and
purity, unblemished morals, and matrimonial concord and virtue, more abound than
in Connecticut.,
24
States responded to these competing pressures, as well as the general social
demand for divorce, by alternately tightening and loosening their laws.
Connecticut, for example, began with a divorce law that permitted dissolution on
the basis of "misconduct," which was defined broadly as any act "that permanently
destroys the happiness of the petitioner and defeats the purpose of the marriage
relation." 25 The legislature eventually repealed the law in the 1870s, as did many
other states with similarly vague grounds. Other states tried to deter divorce by
increasing the requisite period of residency, restricting the right to remarry,26 or
imposing a waiting period between an initial and final decree.27
This ebb-and-flow meant that not only did the degree of variation among states
change, but also that their relative reputations for leniency rose and fell
accordingly. This variation in grounds gave rise to the legendary migratory divorce
- the practice of traveling from one's home state to a state with more lenient
divorce laws to obtain a divorce, and, then, decree in hand, returning home.
Migratory divorce dates back to the eighteenth century, when New Yorkers, for
example, were known to "seek a refuge from [the state's] inexorable law, and take
up a residence in moral Pennsylvania." 28 But migratory divorce as a common and
lamented practice did not really emerge until residency requirements began to vary
as well.
Indiana, for example, enticed divorce-seekers, perhaps inadvertently, with the
combination of an "omnibus" ground, which authorized courts to grant divorce for
"any other cause" in addition to the enumerated ones, and a requirement only that
22 See JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
(1851).
23 BLAKE, supra note 6, at 82 (quoting JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 22 (6th ed. 1881)).
24 Id. at 81.
25 3 GEORGE ELLIOTT HOWARD, HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS 13 (1904),
quoted in BLAKE, supra note 6, at 60-61.
26 Id. In some states, the right of remarriage was withheld from the at-fault spouse. In
New York, for example, a person convicted of adultery could not remarry, while the
innocent spouse could "in like manner as if the party convicted was actually dead." Id. at 65
(quoting 10 LAWS OF NEW YORK, chap. 69 (March 30, 1787)).
27 See generally ELAINE TYLER MAY, GREAT EXPECTATIONS: MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN
POST-VICTORIAN AMERICA 4 (1980) ("Between 1889 and 1906, as the divorce rate began to
accelerate rapidly, state legislatures across the country, most of them in the East, enacted
more than one hundred pieces of restrictive marriage and divorce legislation in an effort to
stem the tide.").
28 BLAKE, supra note 6, at 117.
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the plaintiff be a resident as of the time the petition for divorce was filed.29
Indiana, however, closed its doors to migratory divorce seekers in 1873, when it
adopted a two-year residency requirement and required that residency be proven
more reliably than under prior law.30 Utah, for a time, had the least exacting
residency rule, requiring simply that a plaintiff was "a resident of the Territory or
wished to become one.",31 Furthermore, its omnibus clause permitted a judge to
grant a divorce upon proof "that the parties could not live in peace and union
together, and that their welfare demanded a separation."32 But Utah, too, reversed
its course by abolishing the omnibus clause in 1878. 33 Both North and South
Dakota enticed out-of-state divorce seekers with a three-month residency
requirement, but South Dakota became more common as a divorce destination.
Like other jurisdictions, though, its notoriety enraged moralists who successfully
demanded reform.34 Both states lengthened their residency periods considerably by
the close of the nineteenth century.35
In the end, Nevada became the premier divorce haven and remained so well into
the twentieth century. Although Nevada's unusually short residency requirement -
at first, six months, but eventually just six weeks - began as a way to provide
voting privileges and citizenship to the local mining population, 36 the same
standard was carried over to divorce laws, where it served quite a different
function. The lenient grounds for divorce and the lack of a remarriage restriction
made a state like Nevada appealing to an out-of-stater seeking a divorce, but the
relatively short residency requirement made it feasible. Nelson Blake tells the
story, for example, of Eddie Fisher, who sought a divorce from wife Debbie
Reynolds in Nevada so that he might marry Elizabeth Taylor.37 He married Debbie
in New York and jointly resided with her in California, but he sought a divorce in
Nevada to avoid California's one-year remarriage waiting period.38 A forty-four
night gig at Las Vegas' Tropicana as a night-club singer gave Eddie a basis for
obtaining a divorce in Nevada, since the state law in 1959 required only a forty-two
day residency period as a predicate for filing for divorce.
29 Id. at 119.
30 See id. at 121.
"' Id. at 122.
32 id.
33 Id. at 122-123.
34 See id. at 124.
35 Id. at 127. Blake reports that by 1908 every state but four had imposed a residency
requirement of at least one year. Id. at 129.
36 See id. at 152.
37 See id. at 1-4.
38 California added a provision in 1903 specifying that the initial decree would be
interlocutory and that a final decree could not issue for an additional year. This was
designed to delay remarriage, particularly if there was any question about the validity of the
divorce. Other states had added similar waiting periods in the 1860s and 1870s. See id. at
61 (noting that waiting periods were "a useful device in discouraging hasty remarriage and
uncovering any chicanery that might invalidate the original decree").
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The Fisher divorce was emblematic of a problem that had been noted and decried
for more than a century already: The difference in state laws meant that Fisher was
able to obtain a divorce on terms that his home state said he could not have. This
problem fueled two different, yet intersecting debates. The morality of divorce was
the subject of many exchanges. There were many who believed strongly that
divorce ought to be available, if at all, only in the case of an obvious breach of the
marital obligation, like the commission of adultery. Equally powerful were those
who demanded the right to marital exit and remarriage. Both sides pushed for
changes to the existing laws of divorce based on their normative views about the
accessibility of marital dissolution.
At the same time, though, there was a debate about the specific problems
engendered by non-uniform divorce laws and the effects of one state's lax laws on
other states' stricter ones. Some of the concern was procedural; the idea that one
might travel from East to West and possess a different marital status at each border
was troubling to the frontier-minded denizens of the late nineteenth century. An
1890 traveling show entitled "A Possible Case," presenting on "the stage [] a
picture of complications that might occur in connubial arrangements," captured the
practical problems of non-uniformity. 39 The show demonstrated the absurdity of a
non-uniform set of laws regulating marriage and divorce that would, the script
claimed, leave open the possibility of a "woman being legally the wife of three
husbands.
'AO
The portability of divorce was a perennial concern, evident even in the
nineteenth-century shift from legislative to judicial divorce.41 But concern about
"uniformity" only sometimes reflected concerns about portability. Often, it was a
mask for reiterating concerns about morality in another guise: non-uniformity,
combined with the growing ease of interstate travel, meant that states with
"immoral" divorce laws would effectively trump states with moral ones, as
evidenced by Eddie Fisher's story.42
39 See The Passing Show: A Play from the Divorce Laws of the States, OAKLAND TRIB.,
Feb. 1, 1890, at 12.
40 See id.
41 See BLAKE, supra note 6, at 55. Blake notes the objection raised by New York's
Chancellor Kent that a state legislature's dissolution of another state's marriage would truly
usurp the marrying state's jurisdiction, and raise serious concerns about whether other states
would recognize such a legislative action. See id. On the decline of legislative divorce
generally in the United States, see RICHARD H. CHUSED, PRIVATE ACTS IN PUBLIC PLACES: A
SOCIAL HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN FAMILY LAW (1994).
42 Some evidence of morality-as-uniformity is in the series of uniform divorce laws
adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL),
discussed below. In those laws, NCCUSL adopted a "uniform" set of grounds for divorce,
but made clear that it was a ceiling rather than a floor. For example, when considering a
1907 uniform annulment and divorce act, the committee report explained: "This Congress
desiring to see the number of causes reduced rather than increased, recommends that no
additional causes should be recognized in any state, and in those states where causes are
restricted, no change is called for." Report of the Committee on Marriage and Divorce, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
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As one small California paper editorialized in 1894:
[O]ur divorce laws are both lax and conflicting. A man may be divorced in
one State, yet still be married in another; hence in one State he may marry
again, while in another he becomes a bigamist if he does. The unsavory
reputation which South Dakota has lately enjoyed is but another reminder of
the necessity for uniform divorce laws .... We sorely need some legislative or
judicial reform which shall prevent the disgrace of [lax divorce legislation],
operating to weaken, if not vitiate, the marriage laws of every State in the
Union.4 3
The sentiments expressed here were commonplace by the end of the nineteenth
century. Concerns about morality dovetailed with concerns about uniformity, and
both were used to advocate for uniform, or even federal, standards for divorce.
Concerns about uniformity - driven by both moral and practical concerns - led to
several attempts to secure uniform laws of marriage and divorce. High profile
cases involving obviously migratory divorces renewed concern about the perils of
non-uniformity."a The New England Divorce Reform League, created in 1881, and
eventually reformulated as the National Divorce Reform League in 1885,45 was
dominated by Christian leaders and was central in bringing about the repeal of
broad, omnibus divorce grounds in several states. 46 At the urging of one of its
officers, Reverend Samuel W. Dike, it successfully lobbied Congress for a national
study of marriage and divorce in 1887, which appropriated $10,000 for the
Commissioner of Labor to collect statistics and report them to Congress. 47
Reformers wanted marriage and divorce statistics for two reasons: to study
whether divorce laws affected the divorce rate and to determine what percentage of
divorces could be characterized as "migratory." 48 The data showed that divorces
were rising almost everywhere, but there was disagreement about whether a
particular state's laws made any difference. Economist Walter Willcox analyzed
the national data and concluded that there was almost no correlation between
changes in divorces laws and the divorce rate.49 Only states that went from very
STATE LAWS 122 (1907) [hereinafter 1907 Report]. Thus complete uniformity was not
contemplated even by the body whose ostensible task was to create it.
43 REDWOOD CITY DEMOCRAT, Mar. 29, 1894, at 1.
44 BLAKE, supra note 6, at 133.
41 See id.
46 See id. at 132-33.
47 See id. at 134. See also Edward Stein, Past and Present Proposed Amendments to the
United States Constitution Regarding Marriage, 5 IssuEs IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1 (2004) at
http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss5/artl; see also CARROLL D. WRIGHT, A REPORT ON
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1867-86; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, A SPECIAL
REPORT ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, 1867-1906.
48 BLAKE, supra note 6, at 135.
49 See WALTER F. WILLCOX, THE DIVORCE PROBLEM 66-67 (1897); see also ALFRED
CAHEN, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN DIVORCE (1932) (finding "little perceptible
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broad to very narrow laws experienced any reduction in the divorce rate, and even
then, the improvement was only short-term.
On the issue of migratory divorce, the numbers were even less compelling.
Commissioner of Labor Carroll Wright's indirect measure of the practice was the
number of couples who divorced in a different state from where they had married.
Though twenty percent of divorces fit this profile, the increasing mobility and
movement of the population as a whole meant that many of these resulted from
honest relocations rather than short-term moves undertaken for the sole purpose of
securing a divorce.5 ° Others estimated that fewer than ten percent of divorces were
truly migratory in characteri'
Though the data on migratory divorce were not persuasive, efforts to create
uniformity persisted. Uniformity was periodically pursued via constitutional
amendment. Several legislators introduced constitutional amendments that would
have given Congress the power to regulate marriage and divorce at the national
level. 52 But the push for uniformity through federal action never succeeded.53
A federal law of divorce would have produced true uniformity, and yet it was
unappealing to states at both ends of the spectrum. Lenient states did not want to
be held to a higher standard than they had set for themselves; strict states worried
that Congress would pick a more lenient standard than they had chosen.54 And
uniformity through federal action was a somewhat ironic call given the constant
reaffirmation-still powerful today-of state power to control family law.55 Even
moralists found tension between strict divorce laws, on the one hand, and a
commitment to state control over domestic relations on the other.
56
The alternative to a federal mandate was to seek uniformity through state
cooperation, and that, in the end, was the path more ambitiously pursued. The
threat of federal intervention was in part what animated these efforts.57 Uniformity
correlation between statute enactments and the increase of divorces"); JAMES P.
LICHTENBERGER, DIVORCE: A STUDY IN SOCIAL CAUSATION 144 (1909); THEODORE
WOOLSEY, DIVORCE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1882) (concluding
that the divorce rate was not significantly affected by the type or number of grounds
available, with the possible exception of general omnibus clauses); Ira Mark Ellman &
Sharon Lohr, Marriage as Contract, Opportunistic Violence, and Other Bad Arguments for
Fault Divorce, 1997 ILL. L. REV. 719, 724-27 and 725 n.18 (analyzing the weak correlation
between strictness of divorce law and the rate of divorce and listing relevant authorities).
50 See BLAKE, supra note 6, at 135-36.
"' See id. at 136.
52 See Stein, supra note 47.
53 See BLAKE, supra note 6.
54 See O'NEILL, supra note 7, at 246-47; see also LYNNE CAROL HALEM, DIVORCE
REFORM: CHANGING LEGAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES 40 (1980).
55 See Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canons of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825 (2004); Stein,
supra note 47, at 25-26.
56 See Stein, supra note 47, at 25-26.
57 See CHAIRMAN HOLLIS R. BAILEY, Report of the Committee on Marriage and Divorce,
in HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING 318 (1928) [hereinafter 1928
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was sought by the propounding of uniform state laws of divorce, none of which
was particularly successful. The first such law, adopted in 1900 by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), purported to
deal only with "divorce procedure. 58 Its primary purpose was to eliminate the
"scandal of migratory divorces," which it tried to accomplish by prohibiting
divorce unless the cause alleged arose in a jurisdiction that recognized that
particular cause as a ground for divorce.59 So, for example, a New York wife
whose husband showed her "extreme cruelty" in New York could not seek a
divorce in California even though it was a recognized ground for divorce there.
Other provisions of this uniform act included a one-year residency requirement
before filing suit for divorce and stricter requirements for service on process on the
defendant. It also specified that either party to a divorce could remarry, since a ban
"restrains marriage, encourages adultery, leaves the party in a position to contract
void marriages and takes away a natural incentive to reformation., 60 Although one
had earlier been proposed, the Commissioners did not offer a uniform substantive
law because "of the great divergence of opinion in regard to the nature of the
marriage contract and what are just causes of divorce., 61 The 1900 Act was
superseded by two uniform acts promulgated in 1901 that together covered roughly
the same terrain.62
Report] ("The time for some effective action has now arrived. Federal legislation is being
asked for. If the states fail to act the effort to obtain action by the United States may prove
successful."). The desire to avoid national regulation is behind many uniform law
movements. See Nim Razook, Uniform Private Laws, National Conference of
Commissioners for Uniform State Laws Signaling and Federal Preemption, 28 AM. Bus. L.J.
41, 46 (2000). On the history of uniform laws relating to divorce, see GLENDA RILEY,
DIVORCE: AN AMERICAN TRADITION 108-29 (1991); James J. White, Ex Proprio Vigore, 89
MICH. L. REV. 2096 (1991) (examining the promulgation and lack of success of early
uniform laws of divorce).
58 See STATE BOARDS OF COMMISSIONERS FOR PROMOTING UNIFORMITY OF LEGISLATION IN
THE UNITED STATES, An Act to Establish a Law Uniform with the Laws of Other States
Relative to Divorce Procedure and Divorce from the Bonds of Marriage, in REPORT OF
TENTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE 44-45 (1900).
'9 Id. at 45.
60 See id. at 44. Part of the concern about migratory divorce was the potential for secret
divorces-those in which the defendant never knew a case was even pending. Thus many of
the reforms toward the end of the nineteenth century involved stiffening service
requirements or adding remarriage waiting periods, to maximize the possibility that
defendants would have the opportunity to contest the suit for divorce-or appeal one
improperly granted before either party had remarried.
61 Id. at 46.
62 See STATE BOARDS OF COMMISSIONERS FOR PROMOTING UNIFORMITY OF LEGISLATION IN
THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF ELEVENTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE 27 (1901)
(recommending adoption of An Act to Establish a Law Uniform with the Laws of Other
States Relative to Migratory Divorce and An Act to Establish a Law Uniform with the Laws
of Other States Relative to Divorce Procedure and Divorce from the Bonds of Marriage).
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The first substantive uniform divorce law followed six years later. A 1907
uniform law, recognizing adultery, bigamy, extreme cruelty, habitual drunkenness,
felony conviction, and desertion as grounds for divorce, was approved by the
Commissioners, but adopted by only three states.63  The Commissioners
considered, but did not adopt, a similar, but more streamlined law in 19 2 8 .64
As the twentieth century progressed, uniform laws focused exclusively on
questions of divorce jurisdiction and out-of-state recognition rather than grounds
for divorce. It had become obvious that although there had been a certain amount
of regression toward the mean in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, states
were not willing, by and large, to agree on a uniform set of grounds for divorce.
Persistent non-uniformity of grounds made it important to find ways for states to
peaceably coexist, without triggering the race-to-the-bottom the more conservative
states feared. The 1928 proposed uniform act again took the issue of migratory
divorce head on, declaring any such divorce invalid outside of the state in which it
was granted. It also prescribed the requirements of jurisdiction necessary for a
decree to be recognized in other states.
65
These issues were revisited two years later in an act that dealt only with the
questions of jurisdiction and interstate recognition. The 1930 Uniform Divorce
Jurisdiction Act (UDJA) laid out rules of jurisdiction, residency, and full faith and
credit, designed to maximize the ability of each state to enforce its own standards
against its own domiciliaries. It stated that no court would exercise divorce
jurisdiction unless both parties were domiciled in the state in which the court was
located or, if only one party was, then the domicile must have continued for one
uninterrupted year prior to filing for divorce.66 Divorces granted according to these
rules of jurisdiction were to be honored in every other state.
67
With the UDJA, the Commissioners consciously sought to expand the interstate
recognition of divorces beyond that required by principles of Full Faith and Credit,
while still preserving some measure of state autonomy. In its 1906 opinion in
Haddock v. Haddock, the Supreme Court had held, under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause in Article IV of the Constitution, that a state could refuse recognition to a
decree of separation and alimony if it was granted in a state in which only the
complainant was domiciled and the defendant did not receive personal service or
63 See An Act to Make Uniform the Law Regulating Annulment of Marriage and Divorce,
1907 Report, supra note 42, at 124-30; 1928 Report, supra note 57, at 316 (noting adoptions
of 1907 uniform law); see also BLAKE, supra note 6, at 145. The same fate befell many
uniform acts that were hard-fought by the Commissioners but ultimately adopted narrowly,
if at all. See BLAKE, supra note 6, at 140-45 (giving examples of uniform acts that were
hard-fought within the Commission, but largely ignored by the states).
64 See 1928 Report,supra note 57, at 318-21.
65 See id. at 320-21.
66 See Uniform Divorce Jurisdiction Act, in HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTIETH ANNUAL
CONFERENCE at 502 (1930).
67 Id.
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68
make an appearance. The UDJA went beyond this minimum, stating that states
should also recognize divorces where only the complainant was domiciled in the
granting state as long as the one-year residency requirement was met, regardless of
whether the defendant was served personally or by publication.69  The
Commissioners combined principles of comity with the requirements of Full Faith
and Credit to develop this rule.
As states began to live in a non-uniform system, efforts to refuse recognition to
migratory divorces were not uncommon. The UDJA was adopted by only one
state, and states like Nevada continued to grant divorces where one party had met
the six-week domiciliary requirement and the other party was served by
publication. Haddock had emboldened courts to refuse recognition of some of
those divorces, a practice eventually halted by the Supreme Court's decision in
Williams v. North Carolina70 in 1942.
Lillie Hendrix and Otis Williams were convicted of bigamy under North
Carolina's criminal code and sentenced to prison. Though both were married to
someone else in North Carolina, Hendrix and Williams went together to Las Vegas.
After living in Las Vegas for the requisite six weeks under the divorce law, they
filed and obtained divorces from their respective spouses. Williams' wife received
personal service of the complaint, but Hendrix's husband was served only by
publication. 1 With their prior marriages dissolved by a Nevada court, the
petitioners stayed there long enough to marry each other before returning home and
being arrested for bigamy.72
Before the Supreme Court was the issue whether North Carolina was obligated to
give effect to Nevada's divorce decrees; if so, Hendrix and Williams were not
bigamists and could not be convicted as such. North Carolina contended that the
decrees were not valid under Haddock, since neither defendant in the divorce
proceedings entered a personal appearance in the presiding Nevada court.73
The Court in Williams overruled Haddock, holding instead that North Carolina
must indeed respect a Nevada divorce as long as Nevada's standards for residency
were met.74 The majority noted its reluctance to admit any exceptions to giving full
faith and credit to judgments rendered by courts of a sister state, given that the
"very purpose" of Article IV was "to alter the status of the several states as
independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations created under the
laws or by the judicial proceedings of the others, and to make them integral parts of
a single nation. 75 Haddock did not fit with that general interpretation of the clause
68 201 U.S. 562 (1906). In that case, the husband left the couple's New York domicil,
obtained a divorce in Connecticut, and then held it up as a defense to the wife's New York
suit for separation. See id at 605-06.
69 See Uniform Divorce Jurisdiction Act, supra note 66, at 501 (Prefatory Note).
70 317 U.S. 287 (1942) (Williams 1).
71 See id. at 289-90.
72 See id
71 See id. at 290-91.
74 317 U.S. at 299.
75 Id. at 296 (quoting Milwaukee County v. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1935)).
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and was thus overruled. The Williams court also declined to look beyond the facial
validity of the divorce decrees.
The concerns about uniformity and morality that had pervaded the public debate
were both evident in the Williams opinion, as was the significance of the
controversy over divorce laws as a contemporary social issue. The majority
warned of the confusion that would result from a refusal to recognize the Nevada
decrees:
We would then have what the Supreme Court of Illinois declared to be the
'most perplexing and distressing complications in the domestic relations of
many citizens in the different states.' Under the circumstances of this case, a
man would have two wives, a wife two husbands. The reality of a sentence of
prison proves that this is no mere play on words. Each would be a bigamist
for living in one state with the only one with whom the other state would
permit him lawfully to live. Children of the second marriage would be
bastards in one state but legitimate in the other.
76
While the Court was cognizant of the potential for one state's lax rules to dilute
another's strict ones, it nonetheless refused to foster a rule "which could not help
but bring 'considerable disaster to innocent persons' and 'bastardize children
hitherto supposed to be the offspring of lawful marriage' or else encourage
collusive divorces. 77 The potential for dilution, the Court concluded, was simply
"part of the price of our federal system."78
The Williams case came back to the Supreme Court three years later, and, in a
second opinion, Williams II, the Supreme Court held that North Carolina could
make its own determination as to whether Nevada's jurisdictional requirements had
actually been met.7 9 North Carolina was thus free, ultimately, to ignore the out-of-
state divorce decrees. Although this second ruling rendered the protection for out-
of-state decrees less than absolute, it left intact the core principle established in
Williams I that states must, in general, respect the divorce decrees granted by sister




17 Id. at 302.
78 id,
'9 See 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
80 Williams I put an end to most questions about interstate recognition. See generally
Lynn D. Wardle, Williams v. North Carolina, Divorce Recognition, and Same-Sex Marriage
Recognition, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 187 (1998) (discussing opinions in Williams I and
Williams 11). The Uniform Divorce Jurisdiction Act had been withdrawn as obsolete in
1943. See HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN ITS 103RD YEAR at
1347 tbl. 4 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Proceedings].
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The 1947 Uniform Divorce Recognition Act reflected the approach in the two
Williams opinions.81 It provided that if both parties were domiciled in one state, a
divorce granted in any other state would have no force or effect.82 It also provided
that proof of residence in one state before and after obtaining a divorce in another
state constituted "prima facie evidence" that the person was not domiciled in the
granting state. Unlike the 1930 UDJA, this Act purported to grant interstate
recognition only where absolutely required by Full Faith and Credit, although the
Supreme Court in the interim had in effect raised the constitutional minimum
standard. The Act's prefatory note highlights the persistence of concerns about
non-uniformity and the continuing problem of migratory divorce:
This act takes its inception from the public dissatisfaction which has arisen
over the practice of "migratory divorce," whereby residents of one state
journey to another to take advantage of laxer or more speedy divorce
procedures than those afforded by the state of their domicil. Public opinion
increasingly recognizes the ills which spring from this situation.... Respect
for local law is destroyed. The effectiveness of state policy is broken down.
The autonomy in local affairs which is the object of federalism is subverted...
. Unless some way is found for states to make their laws effective, we may be
sure that the demand for national action will result in Federal intervention. 83
The end of the story for migratory divorce was not the federal intervention that
had been dangled over the states for nearly a century. It was a social movement
that perhaps unexpectedly produced virtually uniform laws of divorce: the no-fault
revolution. The revolution did not come about because of the desire for uniformity;
uniformity, rather, was an unintended byproduct of a percolating demand for easier,
less costly, and more honest divorce. 84 With every state's adoption of at least one
no-fault ground for divorce, 85 the out-of-state "quickie" divorce lost its allure. The
NCCUSL, accordingly, withdrew support for the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act
in 1978.86
II. NON-UNIFORMITY AND EVASIVE MARRIAGE
"Evasive marriage," a term resurrected by Governor Romney's commitment to
prohibiting it, is the understudied historical counterpart to "migratory divorce."
Debates about state marriage laws, and the dissonance among them, followed a
similar track to those about divorce laws. However, the concerns about uniformity
began much later and, at least in some respects, have yet to be resolved.
81 See UNIF. DIVORCE RECOGNITION ACT § 1, 9 U.L.A. (1947).
82 See id.
83 See id. (Prefatory Note).
84 See generally HALEM, supra note 54; HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (1988); RILEY, supra note 57.
85 See supra note 9.
86 See 1994 Proceedings, supra note 80, at 1350 tbl. 4.
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While states generally had marriage laws less dissonant from one another than
divorce laws, 87 they divided at times in history over particular marriage
impediments: interracial marriage, marriages of the mentally disabled, marriages
between those related by blood or affinity, and common-law marriage. Compared
with these historical debates about the appropriate restrictions on marriage, the
contemporary gay marriage debate appears more hard-fought than any that
preceded it.
88
All states maintained statutory marriage impediments relating to physical and
mental capacity, or marital circumstance. States agreed that polygamous marriages
were not permitted,89 and all had restrictions based in consanguinity. Virtually all
states prohibited the insane from marrying, such marriages being either void or
voidable depending on the jurisdiction. 90 "Imbeciles" were likewise forbidden to
marry. 9' About a third of the states forbade epileptics from marrying, though some
only if the epileptic was of childbearing age, and some barred marriage for
individuals with venereal disease or tuberculosis.92 However, these restrictions had
no widespread impact on out-of-state marrying practices.
The marriage impediments that sometimes induced evasive marriages dealt
primarily with age, race, degree of relationship, and restrictions on remarriage
following divorce. All states prohibited marriage below a certain age and permitted
it only with parental consent for a few years beyond the minimum,93 but there was
substantial variation among states in the specified ages.9 4  Every state, except
twelve and the District of Columbia, had a statutory ban on interracial marriages at
some point in its history.95 As late as 1946, two-thirds of the states retained one.
96
Moreover, while states agreed that marriages among close relatives were improper,
87 On the general history of marriage, see NANCY COTT, PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF
MARRIAGE AND THE NATION (2000) and HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A
HISTORY (2000).
88 See Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76
TEX. L. REV. 921, 933 (1998) (noting that same-sex marriage is "unique today in the degree
of moral passion it arouses"). The "debate" dates back at least to the 1970s, when the first
cases were brought (unsuccessfully) to challenge state bans on same-sex marriage. See, e.g.,
Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973).
89 See MORRILL ACT, ch. 125, 12 Stat. 501 (1862) (making polygamy a federal crime); see
also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding bigamy conviction).
90 See FRIEDMAN, PRIVATE LIvEs, supra note 7, at 53.
91 See JOHN W. MORLAND, KEEZER ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 198 (3d ed.
1946); see also FRIEDMAN, PRIVATE LivEs, supra note 7, at 51-53 (describing common
restrictions on marriage and noting the origin of some in the principles of eugenics).
92 See MORLAND, supra note 91, at 200-0 1.
93 In almost every state, the age requirements differed for males and females; females
could generally marry two to three years earlier younger than their male counterparts. See,
e.g., id., at 210-12 (compiling chart of state statutes on marriage rules respecting age).
94 Kansas, for example, permitted a 12-year-old female to marry with parental consent,
while Arizona would not permit her to marry until age 16. See id. at 210-11.
95 See Stein, supra note 47, at 15 (cataloguing state anti-miscegenation laws).
96 See MORLAND, supra note 91, at 214-15.
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the definition of an incestuous marriage varied by state, particularly as to the
treatment of marriages between first cousins. In addition, almost half the states
prohibited some marriages based on affinity, while the remaining states had no
such restrictions. As discussed in the previous section, states also differed on
imposing remarriage restrictions, either a waiting period or a complete bar, on
either or both parties to a divorce.98 These variations, unlike others, did fuel
evasive marriage practices and concomitant legal wrangling over the validity of the
resulting unions.
99
Despite these state law variations, states did not converge around a uniform act
specifying marriage impediments. A Committee Report issued in conjunction with
the 1907 Act to Regulate the Law of Annulment of Marriage and Divorce noted
that it had done some work "prepatory to a consideration of the marriage laws of
the various states and territories," but deemed "it wiser to postpone any report
looking towards a uniform law on this subject" until a uniform divorce law had
been adopted. 100  Four years later, the Commissioners enacted the Uniform
Marriage and Marriage License Act in 1911, which primarily regulated marriage
procedure. As part of its marriage license requirement, the Act urged abolition of
common law marriage. It included a provision for requiring parental consent for
parties below a certain age, but, given the significant differences among states in
marrying age, it left the appropriate age to be filled in by adopting states. 10 1 Later
uniform laws put forth by the NCCUSL dealt with aspects of marriage, but none
broached the core question of whom should be able to marry.0 2 During the same
time period, there were several attempts to amend the Constitution, either to give
Congress authority to regulate marriage and divorce, 10 3 or to ban polygamy or
interracial marriage outright, 1' 4 but none was successful.
17 See id. at 219.
98 See supra text accompanying notes 38 & 60.
99 See, e.g., Pennegar v. State, 10 S.W. 305 (Tenn. 1888) (considering whether to
recognize an evasive marriage, contracted elsewhere to avoid Tennessee's restrictions on the
right of an adulterer to remarry); E.H. Schopler, Conflict of Laws as to Validity of Marriage
Attacked Because of Nonage, 71 A.L.R.2d 687 (1960) (cataloguing cases decided over the
course of several decades about whether states should recognize marriages that were validly
celebrated in one state but would not have been in the forum state because of "nonage");
P.H. Vartanian, Recognition of Foreign Marriage as Affected by Local Miscegenation Law,
3 A.L.R. 2d 240, 242 (1949) (analyzing marriage recognition cases involving miscegenation
bans).
1oo See 1907 Report, supra note 42, at 122.
1o1 See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND MARRIAGE LICENSE ACT § 5, 9 U.L.A. 256 (1911). The
Commissioners' notes to the age provision report that, at the time, thirty states had adopted a
marrying age higher than the common law ones of fourteen for boys and twelve for girls.
See id. at 257.
'
02 See, e.g., AN ACT PROVIDING FOR RETURN OF MARRIAGE STATISTICS (1907); MARRIAGE
LICENSE APPLICATION ACT (1950); UNIV. MARITAL PROPERTY ACT (1983); UNIF.
PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT (1983).
103 See supra text accompanying note 52.
104 See Stein, supra note 47, at 15-21.
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The non-uniformity among state laws with respect to marriage impediments was,
instead, addressed indirectly. As with divorce, where agreement could not be
reached on the actual grounds for divorce, uniform marriage acts were designed to
mimic some of the benefits of uniformity without fully achieving it. The
"uniformity" sought was in fact a uniform rule of marriage recognition, rather than
a uniform rule of marriage per se, and its purpose was to limit the impact of one
state's marriage laws on any other state.
In 1912, the Commissioners adopted the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act
(UMEA),'1 5 which took head-on the ability of parties to avoid their home state's
marriage restrictions by marrying elsewhere and then returning immediately home.
Similar to rules regulating interstate recognition of divorce decrees, the UMEA was
calculated to protect strict states from being undermined by laxer ones. It did this
with four intersecting provisions designed to limit "evasive" marriages. First, it
provided that a marriage contracted outside of a person's home state, which would
not have been permissible within his home state, would be given no effect in that
state. 10 6 Second, in a so-called "reverse" marriage evasion provision, the Act stated
that out-of-state residents were not permitted to marry in a state unless their home
state permitted them to marry as well.'0 7 Third, the Act required state officers to
obtain proof that an out-of-state couple seeking a marriage license would not be
prohibited from marrying in their home state.10 8  Finally, the Act made it a
misdemeanor to issue a license for or celebrate a marriage in violation of the
evasion rules.
0 9
Like the various acts designed to regulate migratory divorce, the UMEA was
calculated to avoid some of the pitfalls of non-uniformity without forcing the states
to agree on a standard list of impediments to marriage. It created exceptions to the
"place of celebration" rule, which otherwise dictated that states would generally
recognize marriages as long as they were valid where celebrated." 0 Although most
states followed some form of this general rule, polygamous and incestuous
marriages were both considered "universal" exceptions to the rule of recognition
and were thus not deserving of out-of-state recognition even without an enacted
law barring marriage evasion."' If adopted widely and followed, the UMEA
would have had the effect of allowing each state to enforce its own marriage laws
105 See UNIF. MARRIAGE EVAsION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 225 (1923).
'
06 See id at § 1.
107 See id. at § 2.
1o' See id. at § 3.
109 See id. at § 4.
11l See id. (Case Notes).
"'1 See, e.g., Medway v. Needham, 16 Mass. 157, 161 (1819) (drawing a distinction
between marriage impediments that would cause universal outrage and those that were a
function of "political expediency"); Pennegar v. State, 10 S.W.2d 305 (Tenn. 1888) (noting
that polygamous and incestuous marriages were never granted out-of-state recognition,
regardless of their validity where celebrated); MORLAND, supra note 91, at 20-21 (noting
universal exceptions to rule of recognition).
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against its own domiciliaries. But, like most of the uniform acts purporting to
regulate marriage or divorce, it was adopted in only a handful of states.'l 2
Even without widespread adoption of this particular act, though, the principle
underlying the UMEA made its way into the common law more broadly. Treatises,
for example, included evasive marriage in the list of exceptions to the place of
celebration rule." 3  The catalyst for the UMEA in particular and anti-evasion
principles more generally was the same: to minimize the effects of the underlying
variation in state laws respecting the capacity to marry.
Despite the failure of states to adopt uniform anti-evasion laws, the practice of
marriage evasion was never truly epidemic. The collective debate about its evils
was never as pervasive or piqued as the parallel debate about migratory divorce.
To be sure, the occasional lovestruck teenagers snuck across state lines to marry in
violation of their home state's laws, 1 4 and many interracial couples did the same
until the Supreme Court held anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional in Loving v.
Virginia in 1967.1" Before Loving, the willingness of states to recognize out-of-
state interracial marriages, when their own laws forbade them, was repeatedly
tested. Consensus grew around two general principles. States generally denied
recognition of a truly evasive interracial marriage," 6 but granted recognition when
the couple was originally domiciled in the state in which the marriage was
celebrated, even though in both cases recognition would be inconsistent with the
state's own laws. 1
7
After Loving, impediments to marriage varied little from one state to the next.
Even though states continued to differ in their treatment of cousin marriages and
some affinitous marriages, race restrictions disappeared by mandate, age
112 Five states adopted the UMEA during the first decade after it was put forth. Other
states subsequently adopted statutes dealing with evasive marriages, either broadly, like the
UMEA, or more narrowly with respect to particular impediments. See generally
Koppelman, supra note 88, at 923 n.2.
113 See, e.g., MORLAND, supra note 91, at 20-21.
"4 See, e.g., Payne v. Payne, 214 P.2d 495 (Colo. 1950) (considering whether a Texas
marriage between two Colorado teenagers could be recognized in Colorado even though
state law prohibited the marriage).
"5 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
116 See Vartanian, supra note 99, at 242 ("[B]y the great weight of authority an
intermarriage between races prohibited by the law of the domicil of the parties at the time of
its celebration in another state in which it was valid, in evasion of the law of their domicil,
the parties intending to return and having returned to their original domicil, will not be
recognized there, but will be treated as void the same as if it were contracted in the state.");
see also Koppelman, supra note 88, at 952-54 (referring to general treatment of evasive
marriages).
"7 See Vartanian, supra note 99, at 240 ("the great weight of authority is that although the
law of the forum prohibits a marriage between members of different races, a marriage of
such persons in another state where the law permits intermarriage of races, entered into by
parties who were not at the time domiciled at the forum, will be recognized as valid there
notwithstanding its statute"); see also Koppelman, supra note 88, at 954-62 (describing the
general approach to recognition of non-evasive, but otherwise prohibited, marriages).
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restrictions regressed toward a mean,11 8 and impediments derived from principles
of eugenics were by and large removed from statutes. Virtual uniformity was thus
achieved almost unwittingly for marriage law,119 as it had been for divorce law
through the widespread adoption of no-fault statutes in the 1960s and 1970s.
III. NON-UNIFORMITY AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: A MODERN CONUNDRUM
Goodridge really did change everything. For the first time in our history, a
single state's marriage laws are significantly different than every other's, and the
difference is exacerbated by the pent-up demand for same-sex marriage nationwide.
The legal change immediately gave rise to thousands of same-sex marriages that,
until last May, were not legally possible anywhere.
The non-uniformity, and long-awaited anticipation of it, has spurred almost the
full range of responses we saw over the course of a century in the divorce context:
attempts to federalize aspects of domestic relations law through Congressional
legislation; attempts to create uniformity through proposed constitutional
amendments; attempts to limit the effect of one state's laws by curtailing out-of-
state recognition; and, of course, widespread litigation. In all these machinations,
we again see the complicated interrelationship between concerns about uniformity
and morality, as well as the ongoing tension between federalism and moral values.
Federal intervention has been urged in response to Goodridge, but in fact it
preceded the decision by seven years. The 1996 Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)
was enacted to protect states from forced recognition of same-sex marriages validly
celebrated in another state. 120 It was pushed through Congress in the anticipation
that Hawaii was imminently to become the first state in the nation to recognize
same-sex marriage. The state's Supreme Court ruled in Baehr v. Lewin that a ban
on same-sex marriage was a form of sex discrimination and should thus be
evaluated using strict scrutiny - the level typically, and often fatally, applied under
the state's Constitution for classifications based on sex.12 While Baehr proceeded
to trial on remand, Congress enacted DOMA, which defined marriage, for federal
purposes, as a union between a man and a woman. 22 It also amended the Full
Faith and Credit Act to exempt states explicitly from any requirement that they
recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages.' 23
DOMA purported to reinforce the tradition of state control over domestic
relations by giving states the right to refuse recognition to same-sex marriages
118 See Guide to Legal Impediments to Marriage for 57 Registration Jurisdictions (July 30,
2004), http://www.mass.gov/dph/bhsre/rvr/impedimentsl %20.pdf (indicating that every state
but six allows both men and women to marry without parental consent at the age of
eighteen).
119 See Stein, supra note 47, at 47 (noting that "with respect to many issues related to
marriage, there has been a convergence among the states").
120 See Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 119 Stat. 2419.
121 852 P.2d 44, 66 (Haw. 1993).
122 See Defense of Marriage Act § 3(a) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2004)).
123 See Defense of Marriage Act §2(a) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2004)).
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celebrated in other states - while, at the same time, leaving open the theoretical
possibility that some might permit them within their own borders. Even DOMA's
most ardent supporters claimed that if same-sex marriage could be limited to
Hawaii, there would be no need for federal intervention. Senator Trent Lott, for
example, claimed indifference to any state's permitting same-sex marriages, but
objected that all states might be forced to recognize such marriages. His stated fear
was that a single state's recognition would make same-sex marriage the rule across
the country - taking away different states' prerogative to enforce their own rules
about whom they would allow to marry. Lott commented, for example, that if
such a decision affected only Hawaii, we could leave it to the residents of
Hawaii to either live with the consequences or exercise their political rights to
change things. But a court decision would not be limited to just one State. It
would raise threatening possibilities in other States because of [the Full Faith
and Credit Clause].
124
Other opponents in Congress made similar arguments. Some expressly praised
DOMA because it would reserve the right of each state to reach its own decision
about the legal status of same-sex unions. 25  DOMA was thus lauded for
reinforcing states' rights, 126 as against both the federal government and one
another.' 2 7 During his first run for President, George W. Bush purported to draw
the same line. During a presidential debate in February, 2000, Bush said he would
certainly campaign against gay marriage if his home state of Texas's legislature
considered it, but insisted he would not tell another state what to do: "The state can
do what they want to do.'
128
Hawaii never recognized same-sex marriage. Indeed, before the lower court
could rule on whether the same-sex marriage ban violated the state's Constitution,
it was amended by a referendum giving its legislature the authority to limit
marriage to heterosexual couples. The Hawaii legislature exercised that power
124 See 142 CONG. REC. S 10101 (1996) (Statement of Sen. Lott) (emphasis added).
125 See id.
126 Professor Lynn Wardle, testifying before the House of Representatives, said he would
actually call the bill "the Protection of Federalism in Family Law Act." See Defense of
Marriage Act: Hearing on H.R. 3396, May 15, 1996.
127 See, e.g., 142 CONG. REc. S.10104 (1996) (Statement of Sen. Nickles) ("This bill does
not ban same-sex marriages. It says one State doesn't have to recognize another State should
they legalize same-sex marriages. Big difference; a big difference. If one State wishes to
legalize same-sex marriages . . .they can certainly do so, and this legislation would not
prohibit it.")
128 Interview by Larry King with George W. Bush, Texas Governor, Columbia S.C. (Feb.
15, 2000), transcript available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0002/
15/lkl.00.html.
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soon thereafter. 29 Thus, DOMA lay dormant for eight years until Massachusetts'
Goodridge decision again rendered it relevant.
For all opposed to same-sex marriage, Goodridge served as a renewed call to
action. Familiar themes about the perils of non-uniformity and the imminent threat
to the institution of marriage were invoked as different responses materialized. The
responses read like a rewrite of the history of marriage and divorce - only this time
the reactions and counter-reactions took place over the course of eight months
instead of a century.
Spurred mostly by Goodridge, President Bush renewed calls for a federal
marriage amendment because, in his view, same-sex marriages threaten "the most
fundamental institution of civilization."' 30 The Senate abided his call, introducing
and debating the Federal Marriage Amendment (FMA), which provided that
[m]arriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a
woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be
construed to require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred
upon any union other than the union of a man and a woman.'
3
'
In contrast to the Congressional debate about DOMA that took place eight years
earlier, the Senate's debate over the FMA evidenced almost a complete
retrenchment from the rhetoric about states' rights. The focus, instead, was on the
possibility - described as a virtual inevitability - that DOMA would be
invalidated.132 If that were to happen, there would be nothing, Republican Senators
cautioned, to protect states against being forced to recognize Massachusetts same-
sex marriages under the Constitutional principle of Full Faith and Credit. '33
129 See generally Koppelman, supra note 88, at 930-31 (summarizing legal developments
in Hawaii on the issue of same-sex marriage).
130 President George W. Bush, President's Radio Address (July 10, 2004), audio and
transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/07/20040710.html;
see also Mae Kuykendall, The President, Gay Marriage, and the Constitution: A Tangled
Web, 13 WIDENER L.J. 799 (2004) (discussing inconsistencies in President Bush's rationale
for urging adoption of a constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriage).
131 Federal Marriage Amendment, S.J. Res. 40, 108th Cong. (2004) (introduced by Sen.
Allard).
132 See 150 CONG. REC. S7925 (daily ed. July 12, 2004) (statement of Sen. Brownback)
("Federal judges will likely rule DOMA unconstitutional under the doctrine of full faith and
credit, and marriages recognized in one State will be required to be recognized in all"); 150
CONG. REc. S7925 (statement of Sen. Santorum); see also Koppelman, supra note 88.
133 Of course, many have argued that Article IV does not dictate this result. See generally
Koppelman, supra note 88, at 971-74 (arguing that Full Faith and Credit does not mandate
recognition of out-of-state marriages in all circumstances); see also F.H. Buckley & Larry E.
Ribstein, Calling a Truce in the Marriage Wars, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 561, 603-06 (arguing
that the Constitution does not restrain the right of a state to refuse enforcement to a marriage
celebrated elsewhere); Scott Fruehwald, Choice of Law and Same-Sex Marriage, 51 FLA. L.
REv. 799 (1999) (discussing rights of states to refuse recognition to same-sex marriages).
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The fear of DOMA's invalidation was not, however, the only driving force
behind the FMA. There was a subtle, but palpable shift in the rhetoric of
opponents, who were no longer willing to accept the right of any individual state to
recognize same-sex marriage - even if other states might somehow be protected
from recognizing it themselves. President Bush himself has clearly retreated from
the notion that an individual state should have the right to define marriage any way
it wants. He now speaks about the importance of traditional marriage as "the most
fundamental institution of civilization,' 34 and limits states' discretion to making
"their own choices in defining legal arrangements other than marriage."'135
Republican senators defended heterosexual marriage on the merits this time, having
abandoned the idea that each state should be left to choose its own path.
"Traditional marriage," Senator Rick Santorum argued on the Senate floor, "is
good for everyone."' 36 Other senators pointed to Scandinavia to illustrate that
recognition of same-sex households leads to family dissolution, out-of-wedlock
childbirth, and a general decline in the institution of marriage.' 37 One Senator
pointed to Europe where, he claimed, the recognition in some countries of same-
sex unions has led to the systematic decline in the number of heterosexual couples
who marry, and a resulting decline in the institution of marriage itself. 38 The
FMA, however, failed to muster sufficient votes in the Senate to overcome a
procedural hurdle necessary to bring it to the floor for a vote. 13 9 Republican leaders
have avowed to continue efforts to pass such a constitutional amendment, 140 but for
now it is dead.
Without an amendment to the Constitution to fall back on, House Republicans
introduced the Marriage Protection Act (MPA) just two weeks after the FMA
failed. The Act, which would strip all federal courts of jurisdiction to hear any case
relating to DOMA or the MPA itself,14 1 passed the House by a vote of 233-194. 142
The MPA is important because, without it, federal courts might well invalidate
DOMA. The first lawsuit unsuccessfully challenging DOMA was filed in federal
134 Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Calls for Constitutional
Amendment Protecting Marriage (Feb. 24, 2004), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040224-2.html.
135 Id. (emphasis added).
136 150 CONG. REC. S7906 (daily ed. July 12, 2004) (statement of Sen. Santorum).
131 See 150 CONG. REC. S7921 (daily ed. July 12, 2004) (statement of Sen. Comyn); 150
CONG. REc. S7927 (statement of Sen. Brownback).
138 See 150 CONG. REC. S7927 (statement of Sen. Brownback).
139 See 150 CONG. REc. S8150 (daily ed. July 15, 2004) (Senate voted 50-48 against
bringing the proposed amendment to a vote).
140 See Carl Hulse, Republicans Still Hope to Score Points on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES,
July 16, 2004, at Al.
141 The MPA specifically provides: "No court created by Act of Congress shall have any
jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court shall have no appellate jurisdiction, to hear or determine
any question pertaining to the interpretation of section 1738c of this title or of this section."
See Marriage Protection Act of 2004, H.R. 3313, 108th Cong. § 1632 (2004).
142 H.R. 3313, 108th Cong., 150 CONG. REc. H6580 (2004).
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court in July 2004143 by two women seeking federal and out-of-state recognition of
their recently celebrated Massachusetts marriage. 144 Other suits will follow, and
DOMA could conceivably fall on several grounds: as a violation of substantive
due process, given the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Lawrence v. Texas striking
down Texas' criminal sodomy statute; 145 as an equal protection violation, given the
Court's opinion in Romer v. Evans, which struck down an amendment to
Colorado's constitution banning governmental bodies within the state from
granting any legal protection to homosexuals; 146 or as an unconstitutional
abridgment of the constitutional guarantee of Full Faith and Credit.1 47 And the
MPA may itself be an invalid exercise of Congressional power, in violation of
equal protection, due process, and/or separation of powers principles.
48
This phase of the same-sex marriage debate has just begun. Quests for federally
mandated uniformity will continue, and backstop efforts to limit Massachusetts law
to its own territory will proceed on both state and federal levels. Where these
efforts will lead is impossible to predict. It seems unlikely, given both the
historical record and modem reluctance, that the federal constitution will be
amended to ban same-sex marriage. So whether states will be willing - or forced -
to recognize Massachusetts' marriages remains the crucial question.
As the multi-faceted attempts to craft a federal response to same-sex marriage
proceed, opponents are also pursuing state-level responses. Outside of
Massachusetts, opponents have shored up state laws against same-sex marriage
through the enactment of mini-DOMAs (state laws exercising the authority
ostensibly granted them by DOMA to refuse recognition to same-sex marriages),
149
statutory modifications to make bans on same-sex marriages explicit,' 50 and
constitutional amendments to prohibit state legislatures and courts from
143 Until Massachusetts began to permit same-sex couples to marry, no one had standing
to challenge DOMA.
144 See Wilson v. Ake, No. 03-714, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 755 (Jan. 19. 2005) (rejecting
challenge to DOMA and refusing to recognize a Massachusetts same-sex marriage for
federal or Florida law purposes).
14' 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
146 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
147 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
148 The validity of DOMA and the MPA, should it become law, do not necessarily dictate
the validity of same-sex marriages from Massachusetts. Also unsettled are the antecedent
questions whether a marriage is a "public Act" within the meaning of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, and, if it is, whether there might be a public policy exception to Full Faith and
Credit that enables states to refuse recognition to same-sex marriages even without
Congress' express permission. Principles of comity may also dictate recognition of
Massachusetts marriages in other states.
141 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 741.212 (2003).
150 See, e.g., California Defense of Marriage Act, Prop. 22, § 2, codified at CAL. FAM.
CODE § 308.5 (Deering 2004).
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recognizing same-sex. marriage. 11 Meanwhile, some states - and in some cases
the same states - have created non-marital legal statuses for same-sex couples.152
Within Massachusetts, the response to Goodridge has been two-fold. Opponents
first attempted to block implementation of the decision entirely. The state senate,
for example, rushed to pass a bill allowing same-sex couples access to a marriage-
like status, but denying them the right to marriage itself. According to the bill,
same-sex couples would be able to enter into civil unions with all the "benefits,
protections, rights and responsibilities" of marriage. 153 But the senate requested an
advisory opinion from the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) about the constitutionality
of its law, and the SJC denounced the law as inconsistent with its ruling in
Goodridge.1
54
Meanwhile, legislators in Massachusetts approved a measure to amend the state
constitution to prohibit same-sex marriages,155 but it can not take effect, if at all,
until November 2006.156 Private groups also filed lawsuits to block Goodridge
from taking effect. A coalition of conservative legal groups and individual state
legislators sued in federal court to stop same-sex marriage licenses from issuing,
arguing that the SJC violated the U.S. Constitution when it interpreted the
Massachusetts Constitution to require equality in marriage. The district court
refused to enjoin the issuing of marriage licenses, finding a strong likelihood that
the SJC would prevail on the merits.' 57 After licenses began to issue, the First
Circuit affirmed that ruling.' 
58
As a fallback to these first-line attempts to block implementation of Goodridge,
Governor Romney announced his commitment to enforcing the state's marriage
151 Sixteen states now have constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage, eleven
as a result of the November 2004 elections. See Monica Davey, Sharp Reactions to
Missouri's Decisive Vote Against Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2004, at A17; Elissa
Gootman et al., For the President, Some Easy Victories, and a Crucial Close One in Florida,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 3, 2004, at P12 (cataloguing state-by-state election results).
152 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 et seq. (Deering 2004) (creating domestic partnerships
for same-sex couples).
153 S. 2175, 183d GEN. CT., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2003).
154 See Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 572 (Mass. 2004)
... Joint Session of the Two Houses to Consider Specific Amendments to the Constitution:
Proposal for a Legislative Amendment to the Constitution Relative to the Affirmation of
Marriage House 3190, J. SENATE IN JOINT SESSION (Mass. Mar. 29, 2004).
156 To take effect, the amendment must be passed by a majority of the legislature in two
consecutive sessions and then by the voters. MA. CONST. AMEND. ART. 98.
157 Largess v. Supreme Judicial Court, 317 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D. Mass. 2004). The
argument, rooted in the Supremacy Clause and the federal constitution's guarantee of a
republican form of government, was that the SJC violated the federal constitution when it
rejected the legislature's more limited definition of marriage in favor of a more expansive
one. In the court's view, Massachusetts's Constitution clearly endows the judicial branch
with the authority to decide cases involving marriage and divorce and, if necessary in the
course of doing so, to reinterpret the term marriage. See id. at 82-83.
158 Largess v. Supreme Judicial Court, 373 F.3d 219 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125
S.Ct. 618 (2004).
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evasion law. Today, Massachusetts maintains its original marriage evasion law,
patterned after the 1912 uniform act.' 59 The Massachusetts code retains the core
evasion and reverse-evasion provisions,' 60 as well as the provision requiring clerks
to obtain proof that a non-resident applicant is not seeking to marry in violation of




The state's newfound interest in combating marriage evasion resurrects a long
history of dealing with non-uniformity in the law of domestic relations. History
repeats itself here as concerns about practical obstacles and morality are implicated
by a lone state recognizing same-sex marriage. In fact, parties to Vermont civil
unions have faced difficulties because of other states' refusals to recognize their
status.' 64 They have encountered difficulties when seeking recognition in other
states. These difficulties persist even when the parties seek dissolution.'
65 Out-of-
state couples who married in Massachusetts and then returned home will
undoubtedly face similar difficulties, 166 as will in-state couples who marry but
subsequently move to a different jurisdiction.
67
But Governor Romney's concern about the morality of same-sex marriage, even
if all states were to permit it, is certainly evident here as well. Romney's "Las
Vegas" reference was to the evasive nature of the act--obtaining a legal status that
159 Thirteen states and the District of Columbia retain a marriage evasion law today. See
Koppelman, supra note 88, at 923. Some statutes are coextensive with the original uniform
act, see, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. 457:44 (2004), while others refuse recognition only to evasive
marriages that suffer from particular impediments like incest, see, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. §
93-1-3 (1993).
160 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, §§ 10, 11 (2003).
161 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, § 12 (2003). The code omits the fourth provision
recommended in the uniform act, which would make issuing a license in violation of the
substantive provisions a misdemeanor.
162 See Cote-Whitacre v. Dep't of Public Health, No. 04-2656-G 2004 WL 2075557
(Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 2004) (denying plaintiffs' motion for preliminary relief).
163 See Katie Zezima, Town Yields on Marriage Licenses, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2004, at
A5 (reporting that the last town finally agreed to stop issuing marriage licenses to same-sex
couples from out-of-state in defiance of Romney's instructions).
164 Vermont was the first state to recognize a truly marriage-like status for same-sex
couples. See 15 V.S.A. § 1201 etseq. (2003).
165 See, e.g., Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) (refusing to
recognize a Vermont civil union for purposes of dissolving it); cf Burns v. Bums, 253 Ga.
App. 600 (Ga. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2002) (refusing to recognize civil union for purposes of
measuring compliance with visitation order).
166 See, e.g., Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Arrives at Moment for Same-Sex Marriage,
N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2004, at Al. See also supra note 144.
167 Historically, most courts drew a distinction, for recognition purposes, between an
evasive prohibited marriage and a non-evasive prohibited marriage, even though in both
cases the marriage was disallowed by the state asked to recognize it. Ironically, the modem
mini-DOMAs do not permit such a distinction to be made, and thus non-evasive same-sex
marriages are just as legally ambiguous as evasive ones.
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is not and, in the opinion of many, should not be available elsewhere. That his
actions do not simply reflect concerns about inflicting his state's standards on other
states is evident from his resurrection of an otherwise unused law. For the first
time, the state's marriage license application asks for information about residency,
requires the applicants to swear under penalty of perjury that the information given
is true, and requires the clerk to list the documents reviewed and sign to verify that
the state's residency requirements have been met.168 The Massachusetts code has
theoretically always required this procedure to be followed, but it has not been in
the past.
One theory is that these procedures were trulyproforma, and therefore not really
necessary prior to Goodridge, because Massachusetts permitted marriages on the
same terms as other states. There would be, therefore, no reason for a couple to
choose Massachusetts as the site of their wedding to evade its own state's laws.
But minute variations in marriage law persist, even outside of the hot-button issue
of same-sex marriage. Neighboring New Hampshire, for example, does not permit
first cousins to marry, 169 though Massachusetts does. So, in the spirit of anti-
evasion, clerks in Massachusetts should have been refusing to issue licenses to
first-cousin couples from New Hampshire - or from the 24 other states that still
prohibit cousin marriages 170 - but there is no evidence that they ever did so.
CONCLUSION
Where do we go from here? The future of same-sex marriage is by no means
certain. The immediate future hangs in the balance as we wait to see whether state
or federal constitutional amendments will pass, and whether challenges to laws like
DOMA and Massachusetts' marriage-evasion statute will succeed. The longer-
term future resides outside of legal circles, in society more generally. As we saw
with interracial marriage, a deeply held belief against a practice can undergo a
complete reversal with the passage of enough time.
In the meantime, Goodridge, and, more importantly, the responses it engendered,
present an opportunity to think about the lessons of history. Reconsideration of the
historical role and use of anti-evasion laws is an important part of the lesson. The
practice of refusing recognition to evasive marriages arose during a regrettable
period in our history. The primary use of the marriage evasion doctrine, whether
codified by statute or not, was to refuse recognition to interracial marriages, and
attempts to apply it in other contexts were met with much more limited success. 171
A proposal to amend the federal Constitution to prohibit interracial marriage
168 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, § 12 (2004).
169 See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 457:2 (2003).
170 National Conference of State Legislatures, State Laws Regarding Marriages Between
First Cousins, available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/cousins.htm.
171 See Schopler, supra note 99, at 687 (noting the conflicting authorities about the proper
treatment of evasive marriages in violation of a state's age restrictions).
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nationwide was introduced into Congress the year after the Uniform Marriage
Evasion Act was adopted.
172
As the twentieth century progressed, however, the number of attempts to secure
uniform marriage laws waned 7 3 and marriage evasion laws fell into disfavor.
1 74
The Uniform Marriage Evasion Act, in fact, no longer exists. NCCUSL withdrew
the Act from its active list in 1943, and expressly repudiated it when it first adopted
the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA) in 1970.17' The UMDA follows a
strict version of the place-of-celebration rule, requiring an adopting state to
recognize all marriages as long as they are valid either where celebrated or in the
domicile of the parties.'
76
For Massachusetts to follow this "modem" rule would actually be a return to its
roots. In an 1819 case, Medway v. Needham, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld
the validity of an interracial marriage between residents of the province of
Massachusetts that was contracted in the neighboring province of Rhode Island.
1 77
Massachusetts had an anti-miscegenation law, which not only prohibited whites
from marrying blacks, but also expressly declared such marriages to be void;'
78
Rhode Island did not. It was the prototypical evasive marriage: the couple
permanently resided in Massachusetts, crossed state lines, contracted a marriage
they could not otherwise obtain, and returned to Massachusetts immediately
thereafter.'
79
The validity of the marriage was important because it would determine which of
the two states would be responsible for the support of the pauper couple.
Authoring the opinion that would be widely criticized in other jurisdictions, 180 the
Chief Justice had no trouble upholding the evasive marriage. He wrote:
Now, it is a principle adopted for general convenience and security, that a
marriage, which is good according to the laws of the country where it is
entered into, shall be valid in any other country. And this principle is
considered so essential, that even when it appears that the parties went into
172 See Stein, supra note 47, at 17 (describing various proposals to amend the constitution
to prohibit interracial marriages).
173 See id. at 15 (noting the stark drop-off in proposed constitutional amendments relating
to marriage and divorce after the 1940s-from a high of 29 in the 1910s to 0 in the 1950s);
see supra text accompanying note 102.
174 Note, In Sickness and in Health, In Hawaii and Where Else?: Conflict of Laws and
Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 109 HARv. L. REV. 2038 (1996).
175 See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 210 (1970).
176 id.
177 16 Mass. 157 (1819).
178 See Act of June 22, 1786 ch. 3 § 7 Gen. Laws. Mass. 1789-1822 (Wells & Lily
Cummings, 1823) (codified as amended at Rev. Stat. Mass. Ch. 75 §5) (repealed by Act of
Feb. 25, 1843, ch. 5, Mass. Gen. Laws. 1836-1853 (Dutton and Wentworth, 1854)).
179 See Medway, 16 Mass. at 157.
180 See Vartanian, supra note 99 (describing Medway as a significant outlier on the
question of recognition given to evasive, interracial marriages).
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another state to evade the laws of their own country, the marriage in the
foreign state shall nevertheless be valid in the country where the parties
live. 181
This approach was necessary to "avoid the great inconvenience and cruelty" of
refusing to recognize such marriages.'
82
This nearly two-hundred-year-old opinion makes several salient points that we
might do well to remember today. First, it notes that refusing to recognize an out-
of-state marriage would "produce greater inconveniences than those attempted to
be guarded against," particularly if such refusal meant that the marriage could be
"dissolved at the will of either of the parties, by stepping over the line of a state,
which might prohibit such marriages.' 8 3
Second, the court distinguished evasive contracts, which it would not recognize,
from evasive marriages. Refusal to recognize the latter implicates more profound
public policy concerns than the former, such as the "disastrous consequences to the
issue of such marriages" and "public mischief' that might ensue.'4
Finally, the court noted that its rule of recognition might not apply to all evasive
marriages, but only those - like interracial ones - that are "prohibited merely on
account of political expediency," as opposed to those which "would tend to outrage
the principles and feelings of all civilized nations."' 85 Political expedience should
not be a justification for refusing to honor a sister state's act.
The practical complications of non-uniform marriage laws are real, although
other areas of domestic relations law, like enforcement of child custody orders,
certainly present greater logistical difficulties. 8 6 With same-sex marriage, as with
historical disagreements about the proper standards for marriage and divorce, the
quest for uniformity can be only partially explained by pragmatic need. The
primary motivation for most calls for standardization is to impose a moral
minimum on the underlying practice: to prevent an interracial marriage, to disallow
a divorce based on insufficient grounds, or, today, to avoid a same-sex marriage
altogether.
These mixed motivations explain why same-sex marriage opponents' responses
only partially correct the non-uniformity. Massachusetts' enforcement of its
marriage evasion law does nothing to protect bona fide residents who marry and
then subsequently move. Those couples will face the same legal uncertainty and
disappointment they would face had they never resided in Massachusetts. Were the
real concern about the discontinuities of non-uniformity, a strict place of
celebration rule, like that embodied in the UMDA, would serve the same result.
Those who marry would only have to satisfy themselves of its validity where




"' Id. at 161.
186 See Hasday, supra note 55 (noting many examples of federal intervention into
domestic relations).
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contracted, and they would attain a meaningful, portable legal status. It's only if
the real concern is lax morality that full recognition does not solve the problem of
non-uniformity. And that, of course, is what Governor Romney is really
disparaging about the Goodridge ruling and the same-sex marriages it authorized
with his reference to Las Vegas.
One of the lasting lessons of history is that regardless of the motivation for
seeking it, uniformity of state laws on issues of marriage and divorce has been
elusive, at least when it is intentionally sought. Attempts to federalize marriage
and divorce law have been singularly unsuccessful, and attempts to secure
uniformity through voluntary cooperation have failed as well. States, instead, have
learned to live with each other's different standards, and, more often than not, given
effect to each other's rules. And on the issues that have caused the greatest unrest -
grounds for divorce and interracial marriage - states have gradually come to agree,
though often long after the issue of uniformity was first pressed. Whether these
lessons will accurately predict the future of same-sex marriage is unknowable.
There is certainly reason to suspect that same-sex marriage, like divorce-on-
demand, is inevitable, though it may be many generations before it fully comes to
pass. For now, it is important not to lose sight of the importance that marriage be a
portable status. The ability to shed one's marital status at the state line will
produce far greater corruption than the disfavored marriage itself - no matter what
the destination state's view of same-sex marriage entails.
Or one might simply ignore the lessons of history, and criticize Governor
Romney's choice of metaphors. The "Las Vegas divorce" was outstripped by the
"Dominican Republic divorce" many decades ago when the latter opened its doors
to foreign divorces. In contrast to Nevada's six-week residency requirement,
Dominican law required none.1 87 The 1971 law embraced the "quickie divorce"
with a vengeance by adopting a "mutual consent" ground for divorce (something
no American state had at the time), depriving the court of discretion to deny a
divorce when both parties appear, eliminating any residency requirement, and
requiring an appearance by only one party. 188 So maybe being the "Las Vegas of
same-sex marriage" is not so bad after all.
187 See James A. Fulton, Note, Caribbean Divorce for Americans: Useful Alternative or
Obsolescent Institution?, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 116, 116 (1977) (noting that the Dominican
Republic "liberalized their statutes to capitalize on the thirsting American demand for easy
divorces"); see also Joseph L. Forscher, Haitian, Dominican Laws on Divorce Evaluated,
N.Y. L.J. , Oct. 19, 1971, at 1 (noting that Haiti and the Dominican Republican took
"measures to fill the breach" once Mexico closed its doors to foreign divorce).
188 id.
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